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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The challenge of preserving a user’s location privacy is more important now than 
ever before with the proliferation of handheld devices and the pervasive use of location 
based services. To protect location privacy, we must ensure k-anonymity so that the user 
remains indistinguishable among k-1 other users. There is no better way but to use a 
location anonymizer (LA) to achieve k-anonymity. However, its knowledge of each 
user’s current location makes it susceptible to be a single-point-of-failure. In this thesis, 
we propose a formal location privacy framework, termed SafeGrid that can work with or 
without an LA. In SafeGrid, LA is designed in such a way that it is no longer a single 
point of failure. In addition, it is resistant to known attacks and most significantly, the 
cloaking algorithm it employs meets reciprocity condition. Simulation results exhibit its 
better performance in query processing and cloaking region calculation compared with 
existing solutions. In this thesis, we also show that satisfying k-anonymity is not enough 
in preserving privacy. Especially in an environment where a group of colluded service 
providers collaborate with each other, a user’s privacy can be compromised through 
identity inference attacks. We present a detailed analysis of such attacks on privacy and 
propose a novel and powerful privacy definition called s-proximity. In addition to 
building a formal definition for s-proximity, we show that it is practical and it can be 
incorporated efficiently into existing systems to make them secure.     
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The use of Location Based Services (LBS) has become ubiquitous with the growth of 
handheld devices, PDAs, smart phones and GPS enabled cars. LBSs will flourish even 
more with the surge of new genre of information systems. While requesting for a location 
based service, a user can easily mask his identity using un-linkable pseudonyms [Hoh05] 
but he needs to provide his location information, even if with less precision. The location 
service provider (LSP) or an adversary, who secretly listens to the communication channel 
between a user and the LSP, builds his own chronological record of location data over the 
period of time. Later this knowledge might be used by him with techniques like 
correlation attack, restricted space identification [Gruteser03], observation identification 
[Gruteser03, Mokbel06] etc to link the records with actual user identity. The user’s 
personal preference, state of health, political view etc can be even inferred from the places 
he visits or visited. No wonder, his mail boxes may be inundated with unwanted 
advertisements. This is location privacy violation and due to its possible aftermaths 
preservation of an individual’s location privacy is of utmost importance. 
There are several ways to thwart location privacy violation. One obvious solution is to 
obfuscate, i.e. deliberate degradation of geographic position [Duckham05], the location 
of the query issuer but it degrades the quality of service. Most importantly, the query 
requester cannot be sure of meeting his k-anonymity [Hoh05] (i.e. in his obfuscated 
region there are at least k-1 other users) requirement in this process as he does not know 
the actual position of other users. Achieving k-anonymity in location privacy requires that 
the probability of an attacker re-identifying a user from the obfuscated region does not 
exceed 1/k [Monjur09].  Indeed, the user can communicate with his peer devices, 
2 
 
establish trust, share location among them and thereby construct a region where his k-
anonymity is satisfied [Chow06, Hashem07]. However, in pervasive environment, 
establishing trust takes time and due to mobility of the devices such peer group has short-
lived existence [Satya96] which makes peer-based systems infeasible. Yet another and 
most widely accepted way is to use Location Anonymizer (LA) [Gruteser03, Gedik05, 
Gedik08, Ghinita07, Bamba08, Kalnis07] which sits between users and LSPs. All 
subscribed users provide their exact locations to the LA periodically. This enables LA to 
construct a bounded region, known as cloaked region (CR), for each user, satisfying their 
k-anonymity and other privacy requirements. LA is, however, not the ultimate solution 
because:  
1) LA is a bottleneck in communication.  
2) Each user has to give his exact location and for that LA is attractive to adversaries 
(possibly a Big Brother) as compromising it means gaining all the user location data. 
3) The user needs to secure the communication channel with LA which is costly.  
4) Some cloaking techniques are very costly in both computation by LA and query 
processing by LSP. 
5) There are well known passive attacks against most of the cloaking techniques 
[Kalnis07, Gruteser03] and  
6) All of the existing cloaking techniques (except [Ghinita07] & [Talukder10]) fail to 
meet reciprocity condition [Kalnis07].  
The reciprocity condition necessitates that every user in an anonymization set (AS) 
also generates the same AS for the given anonymity requirement (i.e. k) [Kalnis07].   
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In this thesis, we present an efficient location privacy safeguard, titled SafeGrid that 
makes best use of both obfuscation and cloaking techniques and it can be used with or 
without an LA depending on the user’s choice. In SafeGrid, we divide the entire space 
into obfuscation cells and these cells are built from all the users’ obfuscation 
requirements. Instead of giving his location to LA the user provides one or more 
obfuscation cells. In fact, SafeGrid negotiates with the user the degree of obfuscation 
required in the event a location anonymizer is compromised. Obfuscated cells are 
negotiated earlier and updated after a considerable period of time. LA in SafeGrid uses a 
cloaking technique that strictly meets reciprocity condition [Ghinita07, Kalnis07]. In this 
approach, all LBSs have prior knowledge of the obfuscation cells so that they can pre-
process POIs for each cell and can readily provide results to LA or the user.  
 Although SafeGrid provides performance gain and enhanced attack resistance, the 
cloaking algorithm is based on satisfying k-anonymity. However, in this thesis we argue 
that k-anonymity does not provide sufficient protection against privacy violation. We 
present two attacks, the heterogeneity attack and the conformity attack, and we show how 
they can be used to compromise a k-anonymous location based query. The heterogeneity 
attack reveals that k-anonymity can create groups that fail to provide overall anonymity 
due to lack of sufficient match among the members with respect to some sensitive user 
attribute. Likewise, approaches satisfying only k-anonymity disregard consequences of 
revealing important context [Talukder08] information though the service request and 
pave the way for conformity attack. Besides illustrating the attacks with real world 
examples, we have provided their formal definitions which clarify how they relate to the 
contexts [Talukder08] of the query and static information [Machanavajjhala06] of the 
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users in the anonymity set (AS) [Machanavajjhala06]. Most of the existing approaches 
[Mokbel06, Gruteser03, Kalnis07, Ghinita07, Gedik05, Duckham05, Ghinita08] are 
vulnerable to these attacks as they undergo following problems. 
1) They choose k number of users for constructing a CR on the basis of current locations 
of the users only ignoring any other relevant static attribute of the users being grouped 
together. 
2) Most of the approaches forward the query to the LSP without making any 
modification. However, a query that contains request for a specialized service may 
disclose a number of contexts and static user information on those contexts hastens re-
identification. 
3) They do not consider preference of users regarding any other contexts of their interest 
beyond location on the basis of which they want anonymization. 
As an attempt to guard against the above mentioned attacks we have introduced a new 
notion of privacy, called s-proximity, which requires that each anonymity set (AS) 
contains at least s members belonging to the equivalence class of the query issuer. An 
equivalence class is defined to consist of users having high correlation with the actual 
query requester with respect to a set of static user attributes [Machanavajjhala06]. With 
this new privacy parameter a user’s privacy profile [Mokbel06] takes the form of 
< , ,  >. We propose a pragmatic solution that offers services with such privacy 
protection. Our approach, i.e. the SafeGrid framework, uses a trusted third party to 
mediate user’s query to the LSP. In order to incorporate the s-proximity measure, we 
consider the trusted third party to be equipped with more capabilities and extended 
functionalities. We call this trusted third party Context Aware Location Anonymizer (c-
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LA) as it is featured with additional modules for context based query generalization, 
proximity group formation as pre-steps of CR generation. We propose a novel algorithm 
called Selective Nearest Neighbor (SNN) for AS construction and CR generation. A 
formal proof establishes that SNN provides enhanced privacy by reducing the probability 
of re-identifying the actual query issuer. Implementation of the system validates the 
feasibility of our proposed approach. 
In summary, the contribution of this thesis lies in designing a LBS framework which 
improves both performance gain and attack resistance. The proposed framework, 
SafeGrid never uses the user’s exact location; neither in communication nor in 
computation. LA in it has none of the above mentioned problems. Evaluation shows its 
better performance in CR construction and query processing with less number of POIs 
returned to the client than any of the known works in literature. It meets a user’s k-
anonymity every time, if the required k is not greater than total number of subscribed 
users. In addition, whatever may be the required k, achieved k for each user is close to 
maximum of all k. Most notable feature of our approach is that it generates CRs which 
meet reciprocity condition. A number of attacks can be formulated if the cloaking 
technique does not satisfy reciprocity condition. In addition, we have proposed a novel 
privacy measure called s-proximity and shown how our approach meets reciprocity 
condition along with s-proximity. We have presented several attacks on location privacy 
and unintentional identity inference with illustrative examples and shown that the 
cloaking techniques that satisfy reciprocity condition and s-proximity can overcome those 
attacks. We have conducted extensive performance analysis of our proposed model. 
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Evaluation results demonstrate its feasibility as a practical solution and improvement 
over existing approaches.  
The outline of the rest of this thesis is: Chapter 2 contains background information. The 
proposed grid based location privacy framework has been described in Chapter 3. The 
details of identity inference protection and enhancements to the initial framework are 
provided in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 contains the current state-of-the-art and related work. 
The comparative analysis and experimental results of our approach are presented in 
Chapter 6. Finally, our future research direction and concluding remarks can be found in 
Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2: Background 
This section discusses definitions and brief descriptions of relevant technical 
terms used throughout the thesis, in order to facilitate understanding of the materials 
presented. 
2.1 Pervasive Computing 
Pervasive computing is the notion of making computing services available 
anytime, anywhere and on demand basis to the user [Robinson04]. Starting its journey as 
“Ubiquitous computing” at Mark Weiser’s [Weiser91] Xerox PARC lab (through his 
seminal paper in 1991), it has emerged as “the computing for the 21st century”. This 
technology is especially a synergy of diversified concepts such as mobile computing, 
wireless network, embedded computing, context-awareness with sensor technology and 
human computer interaction. The pervasive computing environment comprises devices of 
heterogeneous platforms and capability. Despite the advancement of handheld device 
technology (e.g. PDAs, smart phones, etc.) in recent years, these devices are suffering 
from a number of challenges  to date [Satya96, Want05], which include but  are not 
limited to inadequate processing capability, restricted battery life, limited memory space, 
frequent disconnection, and limited bandwidth. The applications developed for this 
environment emphasize performance, and the efficient and stingy usage of resources in 
the devices. 
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2.2 Context 
We reiterate the formal definition of Context from A. Dey: “Context is any 
information that can be used to characterize the situation of the entity. An entity is a 
person, place or object that is considered relevant to the interaction between a user and an 
application, including the user and applications themselves” [Dey01]. Pervasive 
computing environment is intended to facilitate humans to convey situational information 
or contexts through widening the conversational bandwidth. This richness of 
communication sets apart the context-aware applications from the traditional 
applications. Location is the most common form of context found in Location based 
Applications and is readily available through global positioning systems (GPS). 
Distributed systems are using the location information available from underlying 
communication infrastructure, for instance cell information in cellular networks such as 
GSM [Schmidt99]. Contexts may take the form of human factors such as personal 
information about the user (knowledge of habits, emotional state, bio-physiological 
conditions), the user’s social environment (co-location of others, social interaction, group 
dynamics), and the user’s tasks (spontaneous activity, engaged tasks, general goals). 
Likewise, context related to the physical environment can be location (absolute position, 
relative position, co-location), infrastructure (surrounding resources for computation, 
communication, task performance), and physical conditions (noise, light, pressure) 
[Schmidt99]. 
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2.3 Location based Service 
Location based Application or Location based Service (LBS) is a special form of 
context-aware application, where only location information is used as contextual 
information and included inside the query. Some of the interesting applications are worth 
discussing before we delve into their privacy concerns. Here are some of them: 
Tracking service: This service allows a user to locate another person when some time and 
location constraints are met. For example, in order to offer quality service to their 
customers, employers may need to track employees’ whereabouts and modify the nearest 
employee’s work schedule to meet customer needs. Parents may want to track their 
children through cell phones while their children are roaming in a particular area. 
FindYourChild [FindChild] provides such services to its cellular phone subscribers. And 
more recently, PocketFinder Application [PocketFinder], downloadable through G1 
phones preloaded with Google Android, provides the same service in US. 
Buddy Finder: This is a friend finder application that runs on mobile handheld devices 
and allows groups of friends to show one another exactly where they are and what they're 
doing. The example of such an application is Buddy Beacon [BuddyBeacon], which is 
available for most mobile phones including iPhone and allows the users to connect with 
their friends even across different carriers. The difference between the tracking service 
and Buddy Finder service is that the location update information is sent to friends only 
with the user’s approval. 
What’s Here?[Gunter04]: This is essentially a local search service for events and places 
in a locality. Examples include a list of forthcoming events in a particular building, 
tourist points of interest, or the route to the nearest restaurants. The location queries are 
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made through an Anonymizer in order to hide the user’s exact location information from 
the Location based Server. iPhone application Earth Comber [Earth Comber] is able to 
find and notify the user on the closest free WiFi hotspots, coffee joints, pubs, eateries, 
fuel, stores, ATMs, live music, movies by title and much more. 
Calendar service, bulletin board service (Constraint based on presence of the owner of 
the resource or the requester of the service): Data from these services will be shared with 
the requester of the service based on some location constraints being met by the request 
issuer [Hengartner06]. For example, the requester may have to reside inside the office of 
the owner of the information in order to get access to the information. The owner of the 
resource is in charge of setting the time and location preferences for accessing the 
information. 
Personal navigator (Campus Locator Service): The service can help a person find out 
locations around the campus through a central location server or by accessing a local 
database search, sensing the nearby access points. The latter technique requires the 
mobile device to keep a local database that maps sensed access points to campus 
locations. To learn more details about the technique, please refer to the Related Work 
chapter for Privacy Observant Location Service [POLS].  
Similar-interests service: This service gathers data from nearby cellphone users and 
notifies other cellphone users within the vicinity that have similar interests. 
Coffee Shop, Restaurant, Cinema hall, Stadium seat availability: Another class of 
applications known as opportunistic sensing application [Kapadia08] exploits the idea of 
sharing contextual information among users in the form of periodic reports and thus 
eliminates the necessity of mounting all the sensing equipment on every single device. 
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The anonymized approach depicted in Hitchhiking [Tang06] is used to infer coffee shop 
space availability. Without much extension, the idea can be used to find availability in 
places like restaurants, cinema halls, and stadium seating. AnonySense [Kapadia08], the 
architecture for opportunistic sensing of contexts, deploys a third party task server and 
application server to blur the location information and performs aggregation of reports to 
preserve privacy. 
Shopping Mall Crowds Pattern: Similarly, the above approach can be used to identify 
which shops are most popular, based on the presence of people. 
Traffic Pattern Monitoring System: This service helps a driver to know the traffic pattern 
of the route or zone to which he is headed. He can plan accordingly to reroute his travel, 
depending on the congestion information provided. DashTM and TomTom® are examples 
of traffic navigation systems where user locations are transmitted to servers, and the 
routes with optimal distance and least traffic congestion are presented. 
Market Model [Gunter04]: This is a type of service where a person can participate in an 
anonymous survey providing personal information to help build market characteristics for 
a group of users. The group may satisfy a certain time/space criterion. An example could 
be the age pattern or average income of commuters at certain time periods at a station. 
This service may serve the marketing needs of a company operating business in a specific 
area. 
2.4 Privacy  
Westin’s definition of information Privacy states “Privacy is the claim of 
individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what 
extent information is communicated to others” [Westin67]. The privacy violation in 
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pervasive computing is thought to be the most contentious of the issues addressed so far. 
With the multitude of information flowing around the environment, individual privacy is 
now an easy prey for the eavesdropper, stalkers and adversaries. Researchers have made 
continual efforts to define privacy that best suits the pervasive computing environment. 
Palen and Dourish [Palen03] defined privacy in socio-technological terms for the 
networked world and described it as the continuous balance of disclosure, identity and 
temporal boundaries. Classical Design guidelines for Ubiquitous Systems by 
Langheinrich [Langheinrich02] present six principles that are common in most legislative 
systems.  He describes the social implications of the ubiquitous system and claims that 
the guidelines are readily implementable in the environment.  Emphasis is on choice and 
consent, pseudonymity, locality, and security measures which are basic design needs for 
every ubiquitous computing application. To summarize the privacy implication of today’s 
digitized world, we reiterate the famous quote of Ron Rivest: “What was once private is 
now public”, “what was once hard to copy is now trivial to duplicate” and “what was 
once easily forgotten, is now stored forever”. So, information transcends boundaries of 
space and time. 
2.5 Privacy issues in Location based Service  
The LBS queries such as “find the nearest shopping mall” or “find the nearest 
Italian restaurant” may seem innocuous, but once the identity of the individual making the 
query is revealed, in the near future she might be bombarded with unsolicited 
advertisements, newsletters, etc. So, in naïve terms, protecting privacy in LBS means in 
some way hiding the exact location of the user making a query. As briefly discussed 
earlier, the task of the Location Anonymizer is to obfuscate or cloak the location 
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information of the query issuer with several other persons in the vicinity. For an 
anonymity level k as requested by the query issuer, the LA will generalize the request (for 
LBS) in such a way that it will contain the location information indistinguishable from k-1 
other users. The principle is known as K-anonymity [Sweeney02] and has been introduced 
for privacy protection of microdata such as census figures, medical information, and 
voting registration. In LBS the concept can be adapted as: a K-anonymized query request 
ensures that the CR chosen for a query offers the attacker a probability of re-identification 
not exceeding 1/K, K being the preferred anonymity level (in short anon level) of a query 
issuer. Details of the privacy protection mechanisms can be found in the Related Work 
chapter. Listed here are some of the useful terms related to privacy protection in LBS used 
throughout the thesis. 
2.5.1 Service Provider 
  Service Providers (SP) are the entities that share or provide a requested 
service/resource. In the case of LBS, the SP provides the result of LBQ to the Servicer 
Requester. The LBS server is considered to be a non-trusted entity. The assumption is 
that the commercial service can collect unauthorized information about individuals and 
use it later for advertisement and marketing purposes. The communication channel 
between the LBS and LA is not considered secure. 
2.5.2 Service Requester 
  Service Requesters (SR) are devices that request a specific service/resource. As 
discussed earlier, the devices are constrained with limited battery power and network 
bandwidth. The Service Requester issues the query through a Location Anonymizer (LA) 
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to ensure the user’s required level of privacy (level of anonymity). The LA obfuscates the 
exact location of the request issuer and forwards the query to LBS.  
2.5.3 Location Anonymizer 
The Location Anonymizer (LA) is a trusted server, whose task is to collect the 
current location information of the users (while making the query) and anonymize their 
queries. Associated with each query is a required degree of anonymity k, which ranges 
between 1 (no privacy requirements) and the user cardinality inside the anon set 
(maximum privacy) [Kalnis07].   
2.5.4 Cloaking Region 
The location information forwarded by LA to LBS is termed as the Cloaking 
Region (CR) or Anonymized Spatial Region (ASR). CR contains k users within it, k being 
the desired anonymity level of the request issuer. The choice of the CR varies greatly 
depending on different cloaking algorithms. The evaluation section provides a 
comparative analysis of different cloaking algorithms including our approach. 
2.5.5 Anonymity set 
The anonymity set is defined as the list of users within the same CR. The location 
represented by a CR is the same for all members of the anonymity set. 
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Chapter 3: The SafeGrid Location Privacy Framework 
In this section, we introduce our location privacy framework, SafeGrid by providing a 
brief overview. Our approach is based on grid structure. We are using a novel type of grid 
structure which is simple and efficient. We have included an additional component for 
performing the task of grid management. The Location Anonymizer (LA) included in our 
framework is used based on user’s decision i.e. SafeGrid offers its subscribers the 
alternatives of directly submitting query to LSP or going through an intermediate LA. In 
SafeGrid, whether an LA is used or not, an initial grid is built. All users, location service 
provider (LSP) and LA have knowledge of this grid. It is fundamental to understand the 
design of the grid we will be using. So, here we are discussing the design issues related to 
our proposed grid structure. 
3.1 Grid Structure 
We consider entire region of service to be composed of cellular units in the form of a 
grid structure. The smallest unit of the grid is called a cell. For the sake of simplicity, a 
cell is assumed to be a square-shaped geographical block. Each cell, denoted by a global 
cell no (
_), has an area (
_) which is set by fixing the length of one side of 
the square shaped cell. We term this dimension as   which is an important 
parameter. A user’s location identity is represented by the cell he is in. A user is never 
required to reveal his exact location rather he provides his cell identity. Hence, users may 
directly contact an LSP to place his request or may go through a third-party Location 
Anonymizer. Although it may seem unnecessary to have an LA, later we mention the 
obvious advantages of using it. Thus we present a framework which has a Location 
16 
 
Anonymizer as an optional component. Users are not obligated to get through an LA 
though they have option to make use of it for gaining more privacy protection.  
3.2 Grid Manager (GM)  
We incorporate this auxiliary component for handling the management of location 
grid. It has the relevant information like width and height of the area of concern. GM 
considers lower left corner of that area as the point of origin of the grid (POG). Most 
important part of grid design is to fix the size of its cells. 
_ is an important 
parameter, as it has various impacts on the whole system. Primary level of anonymity and 
quality of service at client side are directly related to this parameter. Choosing an optimal 
value for 
_ is a difficult task. Moreover, its optimality also varies from user to 
user because users with varying processing capability and diverse privacy requirements 
may possess individual preference regarding cell-size. That’s why it is important to 
consider all subscribed users’ preference while choosing a global cell-size for the entire 
grid. In our proposed approach Grid Manager chooses 
_  according to the 
following algorithm. 
GRID-RESOLUTION-COMPUTE (U) 
1. N ← length[U] 
2. for i ← 1 to N 
3.       do amin ← amin  + U[i].min_a  
4.            gmin ← gmin  + U[i].min_g 
5. amin ← amin/N 
6. gmin ← gmin/N 
7. for i ← 1 to N 
8.       do δa += (U[i].min_a – amin) ^ 2 
9. Amin ← ∞, A ← Nil  
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10. for i ← 1 to N 
11.       do if amin ≤ (U[i].min_a + 2δa) 
12.                then A ← U[i] 
13.                        if U[i].min_a < Amin  
14.                            then Amin ← U[i].min_a 
15. Gmin ← 0, G ← Nil  
16. for i ← 1 to N 
17.       do if U[i].min_g ≤ Amin 
18.                then G ← U[i] 
19.                        if U[i].min_g ≥ Gmin  
20.                            then Gmin ← U[i].min_g 
21. Cell_Res ← Gmin  
22. return Cell_Res and TS 
 
 
Each subscribed user has a couple of privacy preference parameters amin and gmin 
which define minimum size of cloaked region and minimum cell size respectively. The 
algorithm starts with each subscribed user sending these parameters to the GM. The for 
loop of lines 2-4 combines the inputs from all the users. In order to eliminate feedbacks 
from any possible malicious user, inputs that lie at extremities are excluded based on the 
threshold value δa. The for loop of lines 10-14 computes the ultimate lower bound of 
cloaked region, Amin after excluding the extreme values. Likewise, the lower bound of cell 
size, Gmin is calculated in the for loop of lines 16-20. These filtered inputs are considered 
to fix a 
_  which meets every user’s   requirements and ensures that it is 
smaller than every user’s  requirement. A user can compare the 
_ returned 
by GM with his  and  parameter to verify any malicious attempt by GM. Due to 
this, GM does not need to be a trusted entity as it can’t maliciously manipulate grid 
resolution. GM performs this computation periodically with an interval of  amount of 
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time. At time   GM computes grid resolution with the inputs received from the 
subscribed users. It stores the time of this computation as TS along with the validity 
period of this calculated grid resolution (i.e. 
_). 
3.3 SafeGrid: Without Location Anonymizer 
Our preliminary system, which is built on the proposed grid structure, provides a 
location privacy solution without any location anonymizer.  Figure 3.1 depicts how a user 
communicates with GM and LSP in such a system. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Primitive Framework (Without Location Anonymizer) 
In the initialization phase, users send their privacy preference parameters like  
and  to the Grid Manager. Upon receiving data from all users GM fixes the grid 
resolution using the algorithm discussed earlier. Then it informs users and LSP regarding 
this change in grid resolution along with the duration of its validity. User submits his 
location based queries directly to LSP using his knowledge of grid structure. Despite 
sending his own location, user includes a set of k cells in his query. LSP responds with 
the list of point of interests (POI) for all those k no of cells. Although query results are 
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returned to the user for k no of cells, user considers only the ones related to his own cell 
ignoring the rest. As this system eliminates location anonymizer, it provides a number of 
obvious advantages. First, query processing time is reduced significantly. Second, user’s 
exact location is never revealed to any third party. Finally, it eliminates the requirement 
of secure communication channel between communicating entities. Taking these issues 
into consideration this sort of location privacy framework seems suitable for pervasive 
computing environment. 
So far, we have explained our basic approach which is a naïve grid based system 
without LA. Now we discuss that this solution is not enough for securing location privacy 
and a third party LA is indeed required in such a framework. We continue our step by 
step discussion towards our eventual SafeGrid framework which is reliable and efficient 
in terms of privacy preservation and quality of service.      
3.4 SafeGrid: Grid with Location Anonymizer 
While making a location based query, a user’s location is obfuscated among at least  
cells, including his own cell. This approach does not guarantee that the generated 
Anonymization Set (AS) [Gruteser03] contains at least  no of users. In order to ensure 
that user’s -anonymity requirement is satisfied an LA is incorporated in our framework. 
Below we present the architecture of the complete system including a location 
anonymizer. 
Now, we present our grid based location privacy framework, SafeGrid. Major 
components of SafeGrid are GM and LA. A user provides his choice to GM. GM 
constructs the grid for a certain period of time and sends grid parameters 
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< , 
_,  > to users, LBS and LA. From these parameters every party has 
information about the entire grid and anyone can compute a 
_. This knowledge of 
global 
_  for every party is basic to our approach. We discussed about the 
characteristics of GM in Section II. The architecture of SafeGrid is illustrated in Figure 
3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2. Architecture of SafeGrid 
Basic purpose of using a Location Anonymizer is to ensure that the query requester is 
anonymous among at least ( − 1) other users. Users send periodic location update 
information to the LA. With data from all users LA fills up its "# which stores 
the number of users in each cell and a parameter locked indicating the availability of the 
cell in the form of a tuple <Cell_id, User Count, Locked>. Then Location Anonymizer 
uses following algorithm to compute the cloaked region.  
 
 
21 
 
BASIC-CR-CONSTRUCT (GT, U, uq, k) 
1. Sort GT in descending order of η  
2. CR ← U[q].c 
3. CR.count ← GT[q].η  
4. GT[q].locked ← True 
5. j ← 0 
6. while GT has more elements 
7.           do if CR.count ≥ k 
8.                    then return CR 
9.                else j ← j + 1 
10.                       if GT[j].locked = False 
11.                           then CR ← GT[j].c 
12.                                   CR.count += GT[j].η 
13.                                   GT[j].locked ← True 
It takes input < ", $, %&,  >  from the user %&  locating inside cell  %&. ( . Here k 
denotes the anonymity requirement of  %& . The ultimate goal of the algorithm is to 
construct a CR consisting of a number of cells including %&. (  so that the cumulative 
number of users in those cells is at least k. U is the set of all users along with their current 
cell location. The procedure initializes cloaked region with the cell of actual query 
requester. The "#  managed by LA is sorted according to $ 
)%*, +  in 
descending order. Subsequent cells are taken from this sorted list and added to 
 until 
anonymity level of 
 reaches . LA uses this cloaked region (
) as the location data 
to formulate the final query which is sent to the LSP. In the following figures we 
illustrate how cloaked region is constructed when user %,-  locating inside 
./  issues 
query to LA with anonymity requirement of 10.  
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(a) User Distribution inside Grid 
 
(b) GridTable entries, C23 is selected and 
added to CR 
  
(c) Final state of GridTable (d) CR for user u16; users in the AS are 
marked as red 
Figure 3.3. Steps of the BASIC-CR-CONSTRUCT algorithm 
Figure 3.3(a) depicts a sample distribution of users in different grid cells. Subsequent 
figures show the states of the GridTable maintained by the LA. Finally LA constructs 
cloaked region for user %,- including cells {
.., 
./, 
/.} which ensures anonymity of 
12. The cloaked region constructed in this way meets the anonymity requirement of the 
query issuer. However, satisfying k-anonymity does not always guarantee full-proof 
privacy safeguard. In the next section we present a couple of sophisticated privacy threats 
which are applicable to most of the existing solutions.  
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3.5 Location Privacy Attack  
This approach, however, reveals some sensitive information to the LSP or any other 
attacker. We assume that following information is available to the attacker [Ghinita07, 
Kalnis07, Talukder10]: 1) Knowledge of cloaking algorithm; 2) The cloaked region; 3) 
Anonymizing set and 4) Required anonymity level of query requester. If an attacker 
continuously monitors these information over a period of time, he may infer a user’s 
location. We illustrate a couple of such scenarios below.  
Attack Scenario 1: In a grid based approach, CR actually returns a set of grid cells 
ensuring that those cells contain at least  no of users. Suppose, two such CRs are formed 
where 
, = {
.., 
./, 
/.} ; , = {%,, %., %/, %3, %4, %-}  and 
. = {
.., 
/.} ; 
. = {%,, %., %/, %3, %4}. By gaining knowledge of such two CRs and correlating the 
data a knowledgeable attacker can infer the cell location of user %-. The scenario is 
depicted in Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4. Attack scenario 1 for grid based CR computation 
All other standard cloaking techniques can be shown to fall under such attack. It can 
be illustrated through Figure 3.5(a) (b).  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3.5. Attack scenario 1 
Figure 3.5(a) shows that a CR covers 6 users {%,, … , %-}. For instance, user u1 has 
issued a query with anonymity requirement k = 5. The CR in the figure satisfies the 
requirement. Later, when any other user with index 2 ≤  ≤ 6, issues a query with the 
same anonymity level, the shrunk CR in Figure 3.5(b) is provided to the query processor. 
According to the assumptions, the attacker may conclude that the last request issuer is the 
user u1 and hence his location is at the right corner of the CR.  
Attack Scenario 2: Let, a grid based approach constructs cloaking regions as 
, =
{
.., 
./, 
/.} ; , = {%,, %., %/, %3, %4, %-}  and 
. = {
,/, 
./} ; . =
{%-,  %9, %:}. By correlating information gained from such two CRs an attacker can infer 
the cell location of user %-. Figure 3.6 illustrates this attack scenario.  
 
Figure 3.6. Attack scenario 2 for grid based CR computation 
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Identifying the common cell/cells in the cloaked regions of consecutive queries issued 
by %- , reveals her own cell, i.e. 
./. An attacker can easily conceive such attempt to 
break through the location privacy (in terms of cell location) of a user without his 
awareness. Cloaking techniques in other standard location privacy frameworks are not 
resistant against this attack as well. It can be best illustrated with Figure 3.7(a) (b).  
 
(a)  (b) 
Figure 3.7. Attack scenario 2 
As evident from the figures, there exists two 3-CRs with two sets of users {%,, %., %/} 
and {%3, %4, %-}. When the user u6 leaves, the CRs are updated and new CR consisting of 
the users  {%3, %4} also includes u1. So, the user u1 is in the intersection of the two ASs 
consisting of two sets of users {%,, %., %/} and {%,, %3, %4}.  Apparently, two subsequent 
requests from these two groups of users will reveal the actual location of the user u1 to 
the attacker. 
3.6 Remedy  
Attack scenario 1 can be handled if the users in the same set use same CR over the 
time i.e. a cloaking algorithm that conforms to the reciprocity condition [Ghinita07, 
Kalnis07, Talukder10]. The users in a CR always use the same CR until a rearrangement 
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of the CR takes place due to arrival or departure of some user(s). Hilbert Cloaking 
[Ghinita07, Kalnis07] is the one that meets such requirements but it performs poorly 
when it comes to CR area optimization. Similarly to avoid Attack scenario 2 the users 
can’t use overlapping ASs. The ASs should be defined for disjoint groups of user sets and 
therefore conform to the reciprocity requirements. In following section we come up with 
an approach which meets reciprocity condition. Prior to that, a detailed definition of 
reciprocity condition is worthwhile. 
Definition 1. The Reciprocity Condition 
It is a condition for a cloaking technique where it is necessary that the LA generates 
the same CR for every user in an anonymity set for the same anonymity level. Consider 
that the LA generates a k-CR for the user u1 which also includes k-1 other 
users {%., … %;}. The reciprocity condition necessitates that if any other user apart from 
u1, (i.e., a user having an index 1 <  ≤ ) issues any request, the CR of the issuer must 
be same as that of u1. A cloaking algorithm is said to satisfy the reciprocity condition if 
the CR generated by the algorithm ensures that the set of users inside that CR will 
generate the same CR. Although not considered as a necessary condition for any of the 
cloaking techniques in the literature [Gruteser03, Gedik05, Mokbel06, Kalnis07], the 
attacks demonstrated in this section emphasize the importance of this consideration. The 
reciprocity condition has been addressed in Ghinita et al.’s work [Kalnis07] by proposing 
a cloaking scheme (besides Nearest Neighborhood Cloaking - NNC) namely Hilbert 
Cloaking which takes advantage of Hilbert space filling curve. Still, the technique suffers 
from the attack and query quality problem, as discussed in the evaluation section. Finally, 
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we present our eventual solution designed to withstand the attack scenarios by 
constructing cloaked regions that satisfy the reciprocity condition with little overhead. 
3.7 Enhanced SafeGrid 
To ensure that our CR construction algorithm meets reciprocity condition we have 
made some changes to our basic approach. We partition entire user set into some groups 
which we call Anonymity Group (*)*) where all users with identical anonymity 
requirement are placed in same *)*. Anonymity Sets (AS) are formed by taking at 
least  no of users from each *)*. Same AS and corresponding CR is used for each 
member of this set. The CR construction algorithm consists of the following steps.  
Step 1. Partition "# based on distinct values of  to construct Anonymity Groups 
*)*, , *)*. , … , *)*<  where *)*, consists of all users with maximum  
requirement and *)*< consists of all users with minimum  requirement. + denotes 
the common  required by all users of *)*. 
Step 2.  For each Anonymity Group Compute the distinct cells in that group. 
Step 3. Select successive unassigned cells from *)*,until cumulative no of users in 
the selected cells reaches +,.  If cumulative no of users in all unassigned cells of *)* 
can’t meet + , continue selecting unassigned cells from higher indexed *)*  (i.e. 
*)*=,). 
Step 4. Mark all these selected cells in all Anonymity Groups as “assigned”. 
Step 5. Construct a CR with these cells. 
Step 6. Update "# by assigning this CR to each user of the cells in the CR. 
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Step 7. Repeat Steps 3-6 for *)*,, *)*., …, *)*< until every cell is assigned 
into some CR. 
Details of the tasks accomplished in each of the above mentioned steps are shown in the 
following procedure. 
SafeGrid-CR-CONSTRUCT (GT) 
1. Sort GT in descending order of k 
2.  j←1, Anon ← GA[j].k  
3. for i←1 to N 
4.       do if GT[i].k = Anon 
5.                then GA[j] ← GT[i] 
6.                else j++ 
7.                       GA[j].k ← GT[i].k 
8.                       Anon ← GA[j].k 
9. for j←1 to n 
10.       do for k ← 1 to length[GA[j]] 
11.                  do if GA[j][k].c not in GA[j].cell 
12.                           then GA[j].cell ← GA[j].[k].c 
13. while Cell has more elements 
14.           do Cell[c].locked ← False 
15. CR ← Nil, i ← 1  
16. for j ← 1 to n 
17.      do Anon ← GA[j].k  
18.           while CR[i].count < Anon 
19.                     do while GA[j] has more elements 
20.                                    do x ← GA[j][q].c 
21.                                         if x.locked = False 
22.                                            then CR[i] ← x 
23.                                                   CR[i].count += x.count 
24.                                                   x.locked ← True 
25. return CR 
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The procedure takes the Grid Table, GT as input. Each entry of GT stores the current 
cell and anonymity requirement of each user as the values of GT[i].c and GT[i].k 
respectively. GA[p] is the pth anonymity group consisting of users having same 
anonymity requirement denoted by GA[p].k. The two for loops of lines 3-12 partition the 
GT into a finite number of GA’s along with computing the user count per cell.  
Then in lines 13-14 each cell is initialized as unassigned/unlocked. The variable Cell 
holds a complete list of all those cells along with their availability information. The 
actual task of cloaked region construction occurs inside the for loop of lines 16-24. It 
picks unlocked cells from subsequent GA’s and puts them into a CR until the maximum 
requirement as denoted by CR[i].count is reached. Finally, the set of cloaked regions, CR 
is returned.  
3.7.1 Illustrative Example 
An illustrative example demonstrates, in detail, actually how an AS and the 
corresponding CR are constructed by the SafeGrid-CR-CONSTRUCT procedure. Figure 
3.8 and 3.9 show a sample user distribution and the resultant initial state of GT.   
 
Figure 3.8. User Distribution in Location Grid 
 
Figure 3.9. Initial GridTable 
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Figure 3.10 shows the changes of GT after each major step of the algorithm. Step 1 
and Step 2 illustrates the process of partitioning GT into different GAnon’s. Then the 
iterations of the CR construcion step is divided into sequential substeps. They exhibit the 
allocation of unlocked cells into subsequent CR’s.  
Step 1: 
GAnon1 
(k = 4) 
<u2, C41>, <u4, C43>, <u6, C43>,<u8,C42>, 
<u10, C23>, <u12, C23>, <u14, C32> 
GAnon2 
(k = 3) 
<u1, C41>, <u3, C42>, <u5, C12>,<u7,C33>, 
<u9, C32>, <u11, C23>, <u13,C33>,<u15,C12> 
 
Step 2: 
GAnon1 
(k = 4) 
C23 
(3) 
C33 
(2) 
C41 
(2) 
C42 
(2) 
C43 
(2) 
GAnon2 
(k = 3) 
C23 
(3) 
C32 
(2) 
C12 
(2) 
C41 
(2) 
C42 
(2) 
 
Step 3.1: 
CR1: [C23, C33] 
GAnon1 
(k = 4) 
C23 
(3) 
C33 
(2) 
C41 
(2) 
C42 
(2) 
C43 
(2) 
GAnon2 
(k = 3) 
C23 
(3) 
C32 
(2) 
C12 
(2) 
C41 
(2) 
C42 
(2) 
 
Step 3.2: 
CR1: [C23, C33]; CR2: [C41, C42] 
GAnon1 
(k = 4) 
C23 
(3) 
C33 
(2) 
C41 
(2) 
C42 
(2) 
C43 
(2) 
GAnon2 
(k = 3) 
C23 
(3) 
C32 
(2) 
C12 
(2) 
C41 
(2) 
C42 
(2) 
 
Step 3.3: 
CR1: [C23, C33]; CR2: [C41, C42]; CR3: [C43, C32, C12] 
GAnon1 
(k = 4) 
C23 
(3) 
C33 
(2) 
C41 
(2) 
C42 
(2) 
C43 
(2) 
GAnon2 
(k = 3) 
C23 
(3) 
C32 
(2) 
C12 
(2) 
C41 
(2) 
C42 
(2) 
 
Figure 3.10. Steps of CR Construction 
Finally, the constructed anonymity sets and cloaked regions are shown in Figure 3.11. 
From Figure 3.11(b) it is evident that each user experiences greater level of anonymity 
than their requested ones.  
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Cloaked Region Anonymization Set Achieved Anon. 
CR1: [C23, C33] AS1: [u10, u11, u12, u13, u14] 5 
CR2: [C41, C42] AS2: [u1, u2, u3, u8] 4 
CR3: [C43, C32, C12] AS3: [u4, u5, u6, u7, u9, u15] 6 
(a) Constructed CRs and corresponding disjoint ASs 
User u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 … u15 
k (reqd.) 3 4 3 4 2 4 3 … 3 
Cell C41 C41 C42 C43 C12 C43 C43 … C12 
CR CR2 CR2 CR2 CR3 CR3 CR3 CR3 … CR3 
k (achd.) 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 … 6 
(b) Updated GridTable stored by the LA 
Figure 3.11 Final Outcome of SafeGrid-CR-CONSTRUCT 
However, this illustrative example does not hold sufficient proof to our claim of 
satisfying the reciprocity condition. A theoretical proof on that follows next.  
3.7.2 Resolving Trade-off between privacy and QOS 
After constructing the CR Location Anonymizer modifies the actual query by 
replacing the 
_ of actual requester with the set of cells belonging to the CR. At this 
point, LSP receives the 
_> along with the proximity query. It then returns the 
candidate list consisting of possible query results to the LA. Query results are eventually 
returned to the actual query issuer in a special tabular format which includes the 
_ 
of each POI. Upon receiving the list of possible candidates user finds the closest one. A 
noteworthy feature of SafeGrid is that computation overhead in client side remains almost 
same with increasing value of . In order to facilitate this we make use of efficient data 
structure and smart techniques of message passing which are shown below. 
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%)_ ?%@ 
 (
_>) 
(a) Request Message Format 

_ ?%@ 
* A) 
_  
(b) Response Message Format 

,, B,, B. … 
C B , B=, … 
 B , B=, 
(c) Response Message Data Structure 
Figure 3.12 Message Formats and Data Structure 
Query results are returned to the user according to the above mentioned format. 
Depending on value of k size of this transferred data may grow or shrink. But the 
important point to note that user is concerned only about the query results lying in his 
own cell, say DEF, and ignores all other results. Thus a user’s actual query processing time 
depends on the size of his own cell size disregarding the size of CR generated by the LA. 
So, processing time at client side is unaffected by his anonymity requirement. This is an 
indication that SafeGrid greatly reduces the trade-off between privacy and user side QOS.  
3.7.3 Proof of Attack Resistance 
In order to prove the capability of our proposed approach to resist the attacks 
mentioned in this paper, we show that the cloaked region construction algorithm meets 
reciprocity condition. 
Theorem: SafeGrid-CR-CONSTRUCT meets the reciprocity condition. 
Proof: % submits a query and the following cloaked region is constructed. 

(%) =  G (;H,  where  ≤ *, n is total no. of cells 
(%) =  G %I
;
H,  where  is requested anonymity. 
Let, % ∈ (%) then, % . ( ∈ 
(%)   
We prove that, 
(%)  ⊆  
(%)    
Suppose, (L ∈ 
(%)     …      (1) 
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Now, since % ∈ (%)  
⟹ % .  = % .  … (2) [Acc. to CR constr. algorithm]   
Then, (% ∈ N)  ⟹ (% ∈ N) [Defn. of GA] 
where the pth anonymity group, N =  G %O
PQ.;
OH,   

(%) = {∪ ( | ∀@ ∃ ( =  %O. (} 
Now, ∀(L ∈ 
(%) ∀% ∈ (L  %.  =  % .   
Let, (L =  %& . ( and %&.  =  % .  =  V  
According to Eqn. (2) %&.  =  % .   
⟹ (%&) =  (%)  
⟹ % ∈ (%&) 
⟹ (L  ∈ 
(%&)  
⟹ (L  ∈ 
(%) …   (3) 
[∀%C ∈ Y%&Z (L
(%&) ⟹ (L ∈ 
(%C)]  
Hence, from eqn. (1) and eqn. (3) we obtain, 
∀\ (L ∈ 
(%)  ⟹ (L  ∈ 
(%)  
⟹ 
(%)  ⊆  
(%) …    (4) 
It can be shown that (4) is true for any other user lying inside the cloaked region of 
%. So, any other user with same anonymity requirement as  % yields cloaked region 
which does not contain any cell that is not inside the cloaked region of % . Thus, 
SafeGrid-CR-CONSTRUCT meets the reciprocity condition. ◊ 
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Chapter 4: Identity Inference Protection 
Our proposed location privacy framework, SafeGrid enhances the attack resistance 
capability. It ensures privacy of location information against a wide variety of attacks 
including the novel ones introduced in this thesis. The major feature of satisfying the 
reciprocity condition makes it superior to the existing CR-based approaches. However, 
the ultimate goal of preserving privacy lies in preventing unintentional inference of the 
identity of actual query issuer. In this regard, our basic system, along with all the other 
ones found in current literature, fail to provide a full-proof solution, atleast in the sense 
that under some situations the disclosure of the identity of the user may be highly likely. 
In this chapter, we focus on such more advanced dimension of privacy protection which 
deals with identity revelation threats stemming from location based inferences. First, we 
show how the current measure of k-anonymity is not an adequate one considering its 
vulnerability to several new attacks. Afterwards, we present the definition of a new 
measure, called s-proximity. Finally, we propose slight modifications to the earlier 
proposed framework mostly in terms of augmenting more capabilities and functionalities 
on the part of the trusted third party. In addition, several innovative algorithms are 
formulated to assimilate the proposed privacy measure into the cloaking algorithm being 
used.        
4.1 Identity Inference Attacks 
In this section, we exhibit that the conventional measure, k-anonymity does not 
provide sufficient protection against privacy violation. Two attacks called, the 
heterogeneity attack and the conformity attack, are presented and it is demonstrated how 
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they can be used to compromise a k-anonymous location based query. The heterogeneity 
attack reveals that k-anonymity can create groups that fail to provide overall anonymity 
due to lack of sufficient match among the members with respect to some sensitive user 
attribute. Likewise, approaches satisfying only k-anonymity disregard consequences of 
revealing important context [Talukder08] information though the service request and 
pave the way for conformity attack. Besides illustrating the attacks with real world 
examples, the section provides their formal definitions which clarify how they relate to 
the contexts [Talukder08] of the query and static information [Machanavajjhala06] of the 
users in the anonymity set (AS) [Machanavajjhala06]. 
4.1.1 Example Scenarios 
     Let’s take a look at some real world examples of location based services to better 
understand the threat of privacy violation. The examples demonstrate that existing 
solutions which depend on satisfying k-anonymity are still vulnerable to privacy violation 
attacks.  
     We assume Alice is currently subscribed to a location based system which uses a 
trusted LA to make her location k-anonymous and forward her query to the LSP. Alice is 
guaranteed that her exact location is never disclosed to the LSP by assuring that she 
remains k-anonymous to the unknown third-party where k is chosen by herself according 
to her required privacy level. However, we present couple of random scenarios where her 
ultimate privacy is shown to be endangered although her location is k-anonymous to the 
LSP.  
Scenario 1: Alice, owing to some chronic disease, goes through regular medical 
checkup. She moves to a new place and looks for the nearest medical center. Due to the 
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specific nature of her illness she is considering only healthcare centers that treat feminine 
diseases. This makes it logical for her to query for the nearest female hospital from her 
current location. She submits her query regarding locating the nearest female hospital to 
the LSP. The LBS system that handles her request provides her with the requested service 
along with preserving her location privacy by means of ensuring that her location 
information is made k-anonymous before being submitted to any un-trusted party (in this 
case, LSP).        
Scenario 2: Here Alice uses the LBS system for her academic purpose. As she 
starts her new semester in the graduate school, after the first week of classes she is given 
a list of books some of which she needs to purchase urgently. She searches for the nearest 
bookstores from her residence and is served by the LBS system. The LBS system takes 
her location and returns her the list of book stores located nearest to her place.    
Scenario 3: Alice makes frequent travels to new places where she faces the 
problem of finding nearest car parks. She is reluctant to disclose all the places she visits 
due to privacy concern. Hence she gets her privacy-aware LBS system involved into the 
task of finding nearest car parks. She feels comfortable because she gets the service 
without disclosing either her identity or location data. 
     In the above scenarios Alice has to provide her location to get the services but due to 
threat of identity disclosure she is reluctant to provide her exact location, rather the LA 
creates a CR and forwards her query to the LSP. If Alice has, for example, k=4 
anonymity requirement, the LA makes sure that instead of her location a CR that contains 
at least 3 other users is sent to the LSP. Thus the LBS system tries to protect her location 
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privacy and finally preserve any un-solicited identity disclosure. Still her identity can be 
disclosed to the LSP as discussed below. 
4.1.2 Attacks on k-Anonymity           
     We assume that the LSP or any other adversary has access to the following 
information [Kalnis07]. 
1) Accesses requested anonymity level (i.e. value of k) for each query. 
2) Recognizes the users belonging to the AS corresponding to the CR of a query. 
3) Collects static profile data of all the users that have made query at some time.   
4) Identifies any special context revealed by the query and maps that context to relevant 
user attribute. 
     Finally it is supposed that a group of malicious LSPs collaborate with each other by 
sharing their knowledge about the users in an effort to re-identify any individual query 
requester. Based on the above assumptions we summarize the knowledge of the LSPs 
involved in the LBS system in the following table. 
 TABLE 4.1 IDENTITY INFERENCE ATTEMPT FROM BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE 
Criteria ^_`abcde f ^_`abcde g ^_`abcde h 
Query Nearest Female 
Hospital 
Nearest Book Store Nearest Car Park 
LSP LSP, LSP. LSP/ 
|AS| (value of k) 4 4 4 
Members of AS (LSP has 
identified) 
{Alice, Bob, 
William, Ada} 
{Alice, Carl, Jacob, 
Michael} 
{Alice, Bob, Daniel, 
Joshua} 
Context of the service Healthcare Academic Transportation 
Relevant user attribute Gender Occupation Driving License 
Findings Only Alice is female 
in the group 
Only Alice is student 
in the group 
Only {Alice, Joshua} 
have Driving License 
Identity Inference 
(probable query requester) 
Alice  Alice {Alice, Joshua} 
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In Scenario 1 the attacker (in this case LSP,)  successfully identifies Alice to be the 
query issuer. The fact that she was grouped with 3 male users who seem unlikely to 
request for a female hospital enabled the re-identification. Her query was too specific as 
well. In Scenario 2 the attacker succeeds again. Here Alice is grouped with non academic 
users which made the attacker guess Alice to be the query requester. In Scenario 3 the 
attacker was able to narrow down the list of possible issuers. From the context of the 
service being requested the attacker knows that any user not having driving license is 
unlikely to request for a car park. There might be numerous occasions such as discussed 
above where k-anonymity fails to guard against identity disclosure. We have classified all 
these into two categories which are discussed below. 
 4.1.3 Classification of Attacks 
1) Heterogeneity Attack: The members in the anonymity set are too much diversified 
with respect to some static attributes. In worst case, the query requester might possess 
some exclusive identifiable property, then she no longer remains indistinguishable. For 
example, an AS which groups a female user with all male users is vulnerable to such 
attack. 
Observation: The anonymity set should ensure the inclusion of a minimum number of 
users with similar profile as the actual query requester with respect to some static 
attributes.  
2) Conformity Attack: The service being requested in the query is too specialized as it 
relates to some particular contexts. A user has to conform to some specific conditions to 
be a potential candidate for such service. If most of the users in the AS fail to possess 
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those properties, chances of the actual requester being re-identified increase. For 
example, a query for a nearest female hospital is too specific. Instead the request for a 
nearest hospital involves fewer contexts [Talukder08, Machanavajjhala06].   
Observation: The query is made more generalized by changing granularity level 
[Machanavajjhala06] of the intended service. 
     Both of these two types of attacks have some common properties as they relate to the 
context of the query and the static attribute of the requester. To better understand the 
notion of this novel attack we define it formally in the following section. 
4.2 Attack Model 
     Now we move into the formalization of the attacks. However, prior to that a walk 
through the notations and definitions will be worthwhile. 
4.2.1 Definitions 
User Set (U): The LA maintains a list of users who have subscribed to it. This list is 
denoted by $ = {%, , %., … , %<} where % represents ith user.  
Context (C): Any sensed information used to describe some physical phenomena is 
defined as context [Talukder08]. In this paper we mean by context any deterministic 
condition or situation that characterizes a service. The contexts can take on different 
levels of granular values. A finite domain of information for all the contexts in the 
application is assumed in our proposed model. Thus, the individual sets of contexts will 
have a finite number of possible values. Using higher level granular values the service 
becomes more generalized.   
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Service (S): We consider, the set  = {,, ., … , } consists of location based services 
only. A user has to provide some sort of location data to avail such services. Although 
location is the major emphasized context for these services, other contexts are also 
associated with each service. Generally each service is provided by an LSP whereas it is 
common for an LSP to deliver a group of services.  
Static Information (SI): The static information could be the user’s static attributes or 
credentials used to authenticate his identity. We refer to the set of static information as 
 = {,, ., … , ;}. We use the terms static information, static user attribute and 
static user profile interchangeably throughout the paper. In some places we have used SI 
= {,, ., /, … , ; } where   stands for ith static user attribute. Values of these 
attributes specify individual query requesters. A subset of SI forms quasi identifier 
[Machanavajjhala06, Cuellar02]. The static information is not directly provided by the 
requester of a location based query rather an attacker collects  it from background data 
sources. 
Anonymity Set (AS): The list of probable issuers of a query request is called an 
anonymity set. The request can be issued by any candidate in the anonymity set. The re-
identification process becomes more difficult as the cardinality of the set increases 
 4.2.2 Formal Definition of the Attack 
The attacker is supposed to possess following knowledge [Mokbel06, Talukder08, 
Ghinita07]. 
1. Query Request, : (, (, ) where 
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 ∈ : service being requested; ( ⊆ 
: contexts of the service;  ⊆  : relevant static 
user attributes corresponding to the contexts of the service 
2. Cloaked Region, 
 = {(\, @)|\, @ ∈  m(
. n, ≤ \ ≤ 
. n.) m(
. ℎ, ≤ @ ≤

. ℎ.)} 
3. Requested Anonymity level,  
4. The knowledge of 
 and  together suffice to know about the anonymity set. 
Anonymity Set,  = {%,, %., … , %;}, where % ∈ $ ∀ 
Now, we suppose the following: 
C. p((): Value of the context ( of service C  
%q . p([(]): Value of the static user attribute corresponding to context ( of user %q 
Based on the above assumptions we formally define the attack model below. 
Suppose, %q  submits query  = (, (, )  to the LSP with cloaked region formed by 
 = {%,, %., … , %;} to meet her k-anonymity requirement. 
We assume that, %q is distinctive from every other user in  with respect to any static 
user attribute corresponding to some context of the service being requested.i.e., ∃( ∈
(|%q . p([(]) ≠ %C. p([(]), ∀s ≠  … (1) 
Now, the LSP being a malicious attacker finds out some context (t relevant to query  
and t be a static user attribute corresponding to (t. Then it looks up in background data 
sources to collect data of t  attribute for all % ∈  . Since %q  is the actual query 
requester, %q . p([(t]) = . p((t) … (2) holds true.  
According to Assumption (1): 
∃s|%q . p([(t]) ≠ %C. p([(t]), s ≠  … (3).  
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The attacker can exclude from the  the users that satisfy eqn. (3). As the size of  
shrinks, the probability of re-identifying %q increases. Collaboration among a group of 
malicious LSPs may yield a context (L for which eqn. (2) may hold for every % ∈  
except %q. Then %q could be immediately re-identified as the query issuer.◊ 
     As we have already defined the identity inference attack in a formal way, we proceed 
to introduce our   approach to handle it. At the core of our solution there exists a new 
privacy parameter called s-proximity which we introduce next. 
4.3 s-Proximity: A New Privacy Parameter 
     A close look at the attack scenarios reveals that if actual query requester is fully 
distinguishable from other users in the AS, with respect to some static attribute relevant 
to the context of the query, her identity may be disclosed immediately whatever her 
achieved location anonymity may be. Therefore, it is highly desirable that at least a 
minimum number of users in the AS have similar profile as the actual query issuer. This 
requirement adds a novel parameter, called s-proximity, to the users’ privacy profile 
[Li07]. Before defining s-proximity, we need to introduce couple of relevant definitions. 
Dissimilarity Measure: This metric measures the amount of divergence between two 
users with respect to a certain static user attribute. We use the notation uN(% , %) to 
denote the dissimilarity measure between % and % based on N  where N  is a static 
attribute corresponding to the context (N of service C. uN(% , %) <  ⇒ %~ % [% 
is “similar to” %],  is a user defined threshold value.  
Equivalence Class (E): The set of users that are similar to %with respect to pth static 
attribute N is called equivalence class of % and denoted by xuN(%). 
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xuN(%) = y%C ∈ $zY%~%CZ ∧ Y = NZ| 
                = {%C ∈ $|uNY% , %CZ < } 
Divergence Class (D):  The set of users that are not similar to %with respect to pth static 
attribute N is called divergence class of % and denoted by uN(%). 
uN(%) = y%C ∈ $zY% ≁ %CZ ∧ Y = NZ| 
                = {%C ∈ $|uNY% , %CZ ≥ } 
s-Proximity: By s-proximity we mean that the AS will contain at least (s-1) other users 
similar to the actual query requester %q, i.e., | ∩ xu N(%q)| ≥ . 
Selecting higher value of s guarantees strong privacy but at the cost of degraded quality 
of service. So, users themselves are responsible for choosing value of s according to their 
preference.  
Enhanced Privacy Profile (, , E  ): With the introduction of s-proximity our model 
assumes that a user’s privacy profile consists of ,  and  which stand for anonymity 
requirement, proximity requirement and minimum CR area constraint. 
4.4 Context-Aware Location Anonymizer 
We start our discussion with the generalized view of a location privacy framework 
having a trusted location anonymizer (LA). In such systems subscribed users send their 
location based query to the LA which replaces the exact location with a cloaked region 
and forwards the query to the LSP. In reply LSP returns the list of query results which is 
usually termed as list of point of interests (POI) to the LA and eventually the POI list is 
forwarded to the query requester. The system is depicted in the figure below. 
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Figure 4.1. The Location query processing through LA    
Such a system tries to preserve user’s location privacy by implementing the measure 
of k-anonymity. As long as a system ensures that user’s location is k-anonymous to the 
LSP, it apparently succeeds in preserving location privacy. In this paper we have shown, 
this typical notion of safeguarding location privacy by means of k-anonymity is not 
adequate rather it may endanger a user’s ultimate privacy by revealing her sensitive 
private data. To provide a robust privacy solution we need to ensure both k-anonymity 
and s-proximity.  We use this existing privacy framework and incorporate advanced 
functionalities into the LA to provide such a solution. 
4.4.1 Overview of the System 
     We propose a location privacy system with a trusted LA which creates anonymization 
group considering context of the query. At the core of our approach lies an enhanced 
location anonymizer attributed with multiple capabilities and we call it a Context Aware 
Location Anonymizer (c-LA). As the basic functionality is same we use the terms LA and 
c-LA interchangeably hereinafter. The main focus of the solution is on minimizing the 
probability of re-identifying the actual query requester along with anonymizing his 
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location information. A location based query usually contains other sensitive information 
alongside spatial data. Hence, it is not enough to hide only the location data rather we 
propose modifying the query as a whole to minimize any identifying information it 
carries. We term this process Query Generalization which is the first step of our solution. 
The task is accomplished at the LA by an additional module called Query Analyzer which 
identifies any sensitive context in the query and looks for possible generalization. Only 
generalizing the query does not solve all the problems. As we discussed earlier the way 
users are grouped together to form anonymization set impacts the possibility of re-
identifying actual query issuer. The task of satisfying the s-proximity condition is 
performed by the module called Partitioning Agent responsible for splitting the entire 
user set into Equivalence Class and Divergence Class. Finally, the CR Construction Unit 
generates the cloaked region based on anonymization set created from users in the 
Equivalence Class. 
 
Figure 4.2. Architecture of Context Aware Location Anonymizer (c-LA) 
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4.4.2 Details of Our Solution 
     The Context Aware Location Anonymizer, as depicted in Figure 4.2, consists of 
multiple units, each unit performing dedicated tasks. The overall process of 
anonymization is accomplished in several steps which are discussed below in detail. 
Step 1. Initialization: Location Anonymizer maintains a list of services for which it has 
registered with corresponding LSPs. For each service, LA has knowledge of relevant 
contexts using which it generates a set of static information interrelated with the service. 
LA stores all these information in the Service Attribute Mapping (SAM) table which has 
the form: < p(, 
)*\_>, (_*A))*_> > 
     The LA informs its subscribed users about its SAM table. A user chooses the services 
of his interest and finds the set of required static information. The user then registers with 
the LA providing that static information. 
 
Figure 4.3. Initialization Phase 
     At the time of registration the user also notifies the LA about his privacy profile. The 
user does that in Step 2 in the above figure by passing the values of < , , * > 
denoted by p_)A. In the same message the user includes his personal information in 
_)A and his preferred services list in p_A_. At the end of this phase the 
LA gets necessary information from the subscribed users to fill in the User Profile table. 
Structure of this table is: < $, p_A_, _)A, p_)A > 
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Step 2. Query Generalization: In this step the LA tries to generalize the query by 
modifying the content of the request. In effect, it modifies the granularity level of the 
requested service. To facilitate that all the services are arranged in a hierarchical tree 
structure where a node represents the generalized service for all the services in the sub-
tree rooted at that node. The contexts related to the services are used to determine the 
correlations among them and to construct the tree. This step may be termed as the Service 
Generalization step as well. The main task of service generalization is accomplished by 
using a generalization function. In order to better understand how the generalization 
function works we intend to define the query request in a formal way as follows. 
     A query request consists of the identity of the user, the context and the static 
information and it has a complex domain:  ∈ {$ × Π  
 × Π C}. The context and 
static information contained in this request are modified by the generalization function, 
u to yield a generalized request. The generalized request domain can be represented as: 
′ ∈ {$′ × Π

 × Π C
′} which contains the context and static information augmented to 
higher granularity levels. We have identified the following properties [Talukder08] which 
the generalization function u:  → ′ holds. 
1. Many to one mapping: Two or more requests can be transformed into same 
augmented request that is forwarded to the service provider. ∃,, . ∈ , u(,) =
u(.) = ′, , ≠ . 
2. Idempotent with generalized request: If the generalization function is applied to a 
generalized request, no more generalization will be possible, provided the generalization 
criteria along with anonymity and proximity levels remain the same. 
∀ ∈ , uYu()Z = u(), * = 1, 2, … 
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3. Invertible: The generalization function also has an inverse function. ∀ ∈
, ∃,: u,() = ,, u,:  →  , * ≥ 1.  When * = 1, the issuer of the request is re-
identified hence, the inverse generalization function can be used in simulating inference 
attacks. 
4. Asymmetric: The generalization function and its inverse are asymmetric in nature. 
∀ ∈  ∶  u,Yu()Z ≠ ,  where u,:  →  , * ≥ 1    
5. Non injective: The generalization function is non injective in nature. If two or more 
requests are generalized using the same augmented request it doesn’t imply that the 
requests are the same. ∀,, . ∈ : u(,) = u(.)  ⇏  , = . 
6. Non Equivalence of function: The generalization functions having different privacy 
preferences may provide the same generalization for two or more requests. ∀ ∈
: u,() = u.()  ⇏  u, ≅ u. . Although some of the requests achieve same 
generalizations,  may not be equivalent due to the fact that all of the context or static 
values are not assigned, or the granularity level is coarse enough so that the 
generalization was not applied even. 
Step 3. Proximity Group Formation: The user submits his location based query along 
with her privacy preference parameters (, , ) to the LA. In our proposed model 
user has option to send a set of additional parameters which set the priorities of the static 
information variables involved with the service being requested. Based on these inputs 
the LA partitions the entire user set into two disjoint subsets: Equivalence Class and 
Divergence Class according to the following algorithm. 
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Algorithm: Proximity Group Formation 
Input: query  ∈ : < , (,  >, weight matrix n 
1. Sort  in descending order of n 
2. for ( = 1 ) ) do 
3.        for (s = 1 ) ) do 
4.            if (($[s]. [], $[]. []) ≤ ) then 
               Insert $[s] into x 
5. for (s = 1 ) ) do 
6.         if ($[s] ∉ x) then 
            Insert $[s] into  
7. return x,  
The algorithm takes the query, r and weight matrix, w as input. w contains user’s 
preferred priority of the involved static attributes. Based on that priority other users are 
compared with the query requester. The users that are similar to query requester are 
inserted into equivalence class, E and others are inserted into divergence class, D. 
Step 4. Cloaked Region Generation: In this step the LA constructs the cloaked region 
which is forwarded to the LSP. First, it chooses the AS in such a way so that it meets 
both k-anonymity and s-proximity. Then using the locations of the members of AS the 
CR is constructed which meets the  requirement. The CR generation process follows 
the algorithm presented below. 
Algorithm: Selective Nearest Neighbor (SNN) Cloak  
Input: $, x, , ,  , > 
Initialization:  = {},  = 0 
1. Sort users in $ in ascending order of dissimilarity from $[] 
2. while (|| < ) do 
3.        if (|| < ) then 
4.           if ($[] ∈ x) then 
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              Insert $[] into  
              i++ 
5.           else i++ 
6.        else Insert $[] into  
7. call *
(>, ) 
8. return 
 
     The equivalence class of the query issuer, E, privacy profile (, , ) and location 
vector, L are supplied to the algorithm as input. It first tries to meet s-proximity by 
inserting s nearest users into AS taken from E. Then it inserts other (k-s) nearest users 
into the AS to meet k-anonymity. Finally the AS along with location vector, L is used to 
construct the CR. 
4.4.3 Attack Prevention: Formal Proof 
     We conclude this section by showing that our CR generation algorithm SNN-Cloak is 
attack resistant.  
Lemma: ( − > reduces the probability of re-identification of actual query issuer. 
Proof: Let, %q ∈ $ submits query  = (, (, ) to the LA with her -anonymity and -
proximity requirement. The LA constructs two different anonymity sets ,  and . 
applying SNN algorithm and NN algorithm [Kalnis07] respectively. , meets both -
anonymity and -proximity requirement however . meets only -anonymity. 
Suppose, (L  be a context relevant to query   and L  be a static user attribute 
corresponding to (L. Since %q is the actual query requester,  
%q . p([(L]) = . p((L) … (1)  
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Let, xL  be the equivalence class of %q  with respect to L . Then, %C. p([(L]) = 
. p((L), ∀%C ∈ xL … (2).  
We define, x<< = xL ∩ ,  and x<< = xL ∩ . . Hence, %C. p([(L]) = 
. p((L), ∀%C ∈ , … (3)[SNN meets -proximity] Conversely, 
∃%C ∈ .| %C. p([(L]) ≠ . p((L), … (4) [NN does not meet -proximity] Using (3) and 
(4) we get |x<<|> |x<<| … (5).   
In , the probability of re-identifying %q based on (L and L =  
,
||
  
Similarly, In . the probability of re-identifying %q based on (L and L =  
,
||
  
From (5) ⇒ ,
||
< ,
||
 . So, the SNN algorithm applied by ( − > reduces the 
probability of re-identification of actual query issuer.◊ 
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Chapter 5: Related Work 
Gruteser et al. [Gruteser03] were the first to introduce cloaking technique known as 
Interval Cloak (IC). They calculate CR based on a Quad-tree approach, where they 
recursively partition the space into four equal squared regions until the user fits in a 
quadrant where k-anonymity is satisfied. Another quad-tree variant using pyramid 
structure called New Casper by Mokbel et al. [Mokbel06] achieves superior worst-case 
complexity for calculating CR over IC [Gedik05]. Gedik et al. [Gedik05] introduced 
privacy personalization framework and developed a CR algorithm known as Clique 
Cloak (CC). It assigns Minimum bounding rectangle (MBR) for all the users and if the 
users’ MBR intersects, they are eligible for forming a clique among themselves. k-
anonymity is satisfied if the user belongs to a k-cliqued region. Hilbert Cloak (HC) 
introduced by Ghinita et al. [Ghinita07, Kalnis07] (HC) uses Hilbert’s Space-Filling 
Curve to map user positions in 2-D space into 1-D values. These are subsequently 
partitioned into groups/buckets of k users. HC finds the group to which a user belongs, 
and returns the minimum bounding rectangle of the group as their CR. Nearest Neighbor 
Cloak (NNC) by Kalnis et al. [Kalnis07] tries to make CR small by taking the MBR of 
the nearest neighbors of a user.  Bamba et al. [Bamba08] introduced PrivacyGrid (PG) 
based cloaking technique. They have a similar grid structure like ours. However, the grid 
is static and it does not consider users’ preferences in choosing grid resolution. LA in PG 
knows the exact locations of users. The CR algorithm does not conform to reciprocity 
condition as it computes CR for each user individually. They construct CR by expanding 
in directions (North, South, East or West) by adding a row above the uppermost selected 
row (or below the lowermost selected row) or a column to the right of the rightmost 
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column (or to the left of the leftmost column). In this process their CR may take cells 
where there is no user. Primary contribution of it is the introduction of l-diversity.  
Matt Duckham et al. [Duckham05] first used an obfuscation technique without LA. 
The negotiation process proposed by them may run for several iterations causing 
prolonged service time and the more high QoS the user wants to avail the more private 
information (less degradation of his actual location) he needs to reveal. Techniques 
described in [Chow06, Kalnis07] eliminate anonymizer by considering mutual trust 
among peers. But forming trust relationship in an open dynamic environment could be an 
issue to begin with. The recent technique by Ghinita et al. [Ghinita08] uses a variant of 
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) theory known as Computational PIR (CPIR) for 
finding the approximate and exact Nearest neighbors of the Point of interests (POI). Due 
to the overwhelming computational time techniques using PIR theory seem to be 
infeasible for pervasive environment. CPIR used in [Ghinita08] also requires an 
additional overhead of a huge list of POIs to be sent to the resource constrained device 
and a malicious server may get into user’s private data though not in polynomial time. In 
[Ghinita08] LSP can modify the grid regions at its will as it has control over selecting 
granularity of grid design. Furthermore, [Ghinita08] imposes extra overhead in user side 
in two ways: a user has to perform numerous cryptographic computations and he has to 
maintain a secure communication channel. Following table summarizes the relevant 
research works. 
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TABLE 5.1 SUMMARY OF COMPARISON AMONG DIFFERENT CLOAKING APPROACHES
CR Approach Generate CR for 
each user/query 
Reveals exact 
location to LA 
Requires secure 
communication with 
LA 
Reciprocity 
Condition 
Vulnerable to 
Attack 1 
Vulnerable 
to Attack 2 
IC [Gruteser03] Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Casper[Mokbel06] Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
NNC[Kalnis07] Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
HC [Ghinita07] No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
PG [Bamba08] Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
SafeGrid No No No Yes No No 
Recently Mascetti et al. investigated a more general case in which the adversary is 
able to recognize traces of LBS requests by the same anonymous user [Mascetti09]. They 
introduced the notion of historical k-anonymity. In [Xu09] Xu et al. presented a novel 
technique that allows a user’s location information to be reported as accurate as possible 
while providing her sufficient location privacy protection. They also investigated the 
problem of preventing an adversary from locating nodes based on their location 
information they disclose in communications [Xu10]. They attempted to reduce location 
resolution to achieve a desired level of safety protection and presented a novel 
geographic routing protocol which can work with blurred location information. None of 
these works addressed the notion of reciprocity condition. 
Besides ensuring the reciprocity condition, our proposed approach intends to provide 
location privacy solution satisfying k-anonymity along with s-proximity using a location 
anonymizer. A thorough survey of literature reveals that lots of works have been done to 
deal with location privacy but none has proposed the inclusion of parameter like s-
proximity. Existing approaches in achieving anonymity for the LBS services [Mokbel06, 
Gedik05, Langheinrich02, Ghinita07] have ignored the fact that static information is 
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required during the service access. In [Ghinita07] it is shown that the knowledge of the 
attacker can be used to perform the re-identification attack. The selection of quasi 
identifiers [Kalnis07, Sweeney02] from contextual information can place the individual 
privacy at serious risk [Talukder08]. Most of the existing approaches in the literature fail 
to protect identity inference caused by the attacks we have shown. In 
[Machanavajjhala06, Hashem07] it is shown how individual’s identity can be inferred 
even from a k-anonymized data set. They proved that k-anonymity is not a sufficient 
measure against re-identification attacks. To protect this, the notion of l-diversity is 
proposed in [Machanavajjhala06] whereas [Hashem07] shows the weakness of l-diversity 
and eliminates those by introducing the concept of t-closeness. These works are similar to 
our approach. They showed the identity inference attacks in scenario of micro-data 
publishing whereas we have formulated the attacks in case of using location based 
services. The generic view of the problem was addressed while considering the disclosure 
of a number of contexts and static information involved during the service access 
[Talukder08]. They presented the concept of contexts of a query and related static user 
information from a theoretical viewpoint. We provide a practical solution of the problem. 
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Chapter 6: Experimental Evaluation 
We set the simulation with North-American data set [Hoh05] and used our proposed 
algorithms. Simulation was developed with Java 1.6 and it was conducted on a machine 
with hardware configuration Intel M processor 1.7 GHz, 1.5 GB Memory and Windows 
Vista as OS. First we evaluate our system and then we compare with IC [Gruteser03], HC 
[Ghinita07], Casper [Mokbel06], NNC [Kalnis07] and PrivacyGrid [Bamba08].  
There are two aspects of performance of a location privacy model. These are: level of 
privacy, which is measured by achieved anonymity level, and quality of service (QOS). 
QOS depends on two factors. At client side it is related to the processing time which 
depends on the number of POI returned to the client and this eventually is determined by 
the CR size. QOS also depends on the CR construction time at the location anonymizer. 
We have conducted extensive analysis on how SafeGrid performs in terms of these 
parameters.  
Average size of cloaked region is an important performance metric because processing 
time at the client side directly depends on it. The way SafeGrid constructs anonymization 
sets makes higher anonymity   requested in a cell significant. Once a cell is taken in a CR, 
it is locked and users with lower k requirement are automatically put into the 
corresponding AS. That is why kmax (maximum requested k by any user) is a significant 
parameter and its impact on Avg CR size is depicted in Figure 6.1(a). As kmax increases, 
Avg CR size gets larger. This means that for someone with abnormally high k 
requirement, others’ QOS degrades a bit at the gain of increased privacy. As the total 
number of users increases, more time is needed to construct CR (see Figure 6.1(b)). This 
computation is performed at the location anonymizer, so it has little impact on the client 
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side performance. We have compared performance of SafeGrid with the similar best 
known approaches in literature like IC [Gruteser03], HC [Ghinita07], New Casper 
[Mokbel06], NNC [Kalnis07] and PrivacyGrid [Bamba08]. All these approaches are 
similar to SafeGrid as they involve location anonymizer for AS formation and CR 
construction. Among them PrivacyGrid is the only grid based approach but it does not 
meet reciprocity condition. Other approaches try to create optimal CR by reducing its size 
and construction time. Only HC [Ghinita07] meets reciprocity condition. 
 
(a) Avg CR Size vs. Achieved Anon. [Total User=10000 GridRes=5.0] 
 
(b) CR Construction Time vs. Total User [GridRes=5.0] 
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(c) SafeGrid vs. New Casper & IC 
 
(d) SafeGrid vs. New Casper & IC 
 
(e) Comparison of % Avg Area by CR 
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(f) Comparison of % Avg Area by Effective CR 
 
(g) Comparison of Avg CR Search Time 
 
(h) Comparison of Avg CR Construction Time 
Figure 6.1. SafeGrid Performance 
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Figure 6.1(c) & (d) show clear improvement of SafeGrid over IC and New Casper in 
terms of number of POI returned to the client. In SafeGrid, size of POI list returned to the 
query requester remains almost constant as LA finally returns only the POIs locating 
inside the query requester’s cell. This is how our approach resolves the tradeoff between 
privacy and QOS (as claimed in section V(B)). Figure 6.1(e) exhibits that apparently 
SafeGrid generates larger CRs compared to the peer solutions. However, if we consider 
the size of effective CR, as shown in Fig 6.1(f), our approach gains much improvement 
and even it is comparable to NNC [Kalnis07]. Moreover, from Figure 6.1(h) we find that 
NNC takes very high CR construction time. Here we also find that SafeGrid reduces the 
CR construction time and CR search time on average [see Fig 6.1(g) (h)]. Other 
approaches perform poorly as they construct CR every time a new query is issued. These 
data also demonstrate that SafeGrid is more scalable than others as increased number of 
users cannot impact its performance. 
     We have implemented a prototype version of our proposed system. The modules of 
context aware location anonymizer were developed on a machine with hardware 
configuration Intel Processor 1.7 Ghz, 1.5 GB Memory and Windows Vista as OS. We 
have deployed an application that uses, on client side, a Dell Axim X50v  pocket PC 
(Processor type is Intel 624 MHz Xscale, ROM is 128MB Flash). The underlying OS is 
WinCE and the implementation language is C# on .NET Compact framework. 
     The spatial data used in the evaluation were taken from North American data set 
[Hoh05] consisted of 15K points which were used by clients and the LA as user points in 
2D space. Figure 4 depicts how the client module works. The initialization step 
consisting of the user registration tasks are shown in Figure 6.2 (a) (b). The subsequent 
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figures display how a registered user submits location based query to the LA and gets 
reply subsequently. 
 
(a) User selects her preferred services 
 
(b) User provides required profile and privacy 
information 
 
 
(c) User submits query   (d) Reply from LA with failure notification 
Figure 6.2 Prototype Implementation (User Interface Module) 
     We have evaluated performance of our final system, which implements both k-
anonymity and s-proximity, and the findings are summarized in Figure 6.3. Performance 
of the system was measured in terms of the metrics: Query Success Rate, CR 
Construction Time and CR Size (absolute /relative). The percentage of time a user was 
provided with her required service was denoted by Query Success Rate. Other two 
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metrics measured the time required for constructing a cloaked region and the size of the 
constructed CR. As Figure 6.3 (a) depicts, we achieved overall high success rate though it 
reduced a bit with higher proximity requirement. The graphs in Figure 6.3 (b) (C) 
demonstrate that the construction time and size of a cloaked region increases with higher 
proximity level. These parameters also show higher values for increased number of 
subscribers. Performance of our prototype implementation was compared with couple of 
other existing systems (IC [Gruteser03], HC [Ghinita07], Casper [Mokbel06], NNC 
[Kalnis07]) and it is found that our approach yields cloaked region with a bit large size 
(shown in  Figure 6.3 (d)) which is quite acceptable considering the enhanced level of 
privacy it offers compared to the existing frameworks.     
     From the experimental facts it is evident that our proposed framework with a context 
aware location anonymizer is really feasible to be implemented in real world LBS 
system. Performance of the system is acceptable as compared to existing systems. The 
system implements both s-proximity and k-anonymity which is a novel approach capable 
of safeguarding the attacks presented in this paper. 
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(b) Variation of CR Construction Time according to requested proximity level 
 
(c) Variation of CR Construction Time according to requested anonymity level 
 
(d) Comparison of our approach with existing approaches in terms of relative CR size. 
Figure 6.3 Evaluation Results 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work 
Location-based Services (LBS) have become very popular in these days due to the 
increasing trend of high-end smart-phone usage. Yet, this popularity is sometimes 
diminished by the concern of end users’ location privacy violation. The concern stems 
from the disclosure of location information by the end user or request issuer of LBS when 
he or she submits the location-dependent query or spatial query to the service provider. 
Various methods found in the literature protect location privacy by hiding or obfuscating 
exact location with several other users’ location in the system from the service provider. 
However, none of the methods is still able to provide location based services with full 
immunity from privacy attacks. The concluding note of this thesis includes a summary of 
overall contributions and future directions for the research. 
7.1 Contribution of the Thesis 
In this thesis, we introduce several novel attacks causing serious privacy concern to 
LBS. In this sort of attacks, the exact location of the requester can be inferred by the 
adversary through obtaining cloaking regions (CR) that are shrunk or extended in 
subsequent queries. The remedy to this problem is to retain cloaking regions that contain 
the same set of users over a period of time (reciprocity condition). Most of the existing 
approaches demonstrate a fundamental flaw by considering only a static snapshot of users 
during evaluation. Thus, any modification to the data structure due to mobile user 
location update turns out to be very costly. Our proposed approach is principled on 
developing disjoint sets of users dynamically over time in order to share the common 
CRs.  
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In addition, we have proposed a location privacy solution with a trusted third party (c-
LA) equipped with additional functionalities which are accomplished prior to AS 
construction. The algorithms presented in this thesis aim to construct an AS which meets 
k-anonymity and s-proximity. The novel privacy feature s-proximity is proposed as a 
solution of couple of plausible attacks applicable against most of the existing approaches. 
We have implemented a prototype version of the system. Evaluation results demonstrate 
the feasibility of our proposed approach along with its performance measures. The 
experimental study supports our claim that SafeGrid is efficient and suitable for the 
mobile environment compared to other approaches. In future, we plan to build real world 
LBS applications using the SafeGrid framework. 
7.2 Broader Impact of the Research 
The major contribution of the research will be an attack-resistant privacy protection 
technique for Location-based Services running on resource constrained handheld devices 
that use a Location Anonymizer. The application designers can benefit through adopting 
this approach in their designs and tailoring it to their specific needs by regulating various 
system parameters. The research will have a wide range of impacts on the traffic 
monitoring system, weather forecast system, health care industry (personal tracking 
system), corporate office premise (internal messenger system), school campus (buddy 
locator, campus map), customer support (tracking application to ensure quality of 
service), advertisement, marketing, tourism industry and many more.  
SafeGrid is going to add new dimension to location privacy research in LBS where 
typically the networks are comprised of resource-constrained mobile devices. The 
researchers and the students who work in this area will be able to look into and further 
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contribute to the research results of the thesis, which will be made publicly available.  
The data sets used and experimental results to evaluate the protection model in the thesis 
can be used in promoting research in this area. Finally, the research will benefit the 
research community to advance in the location privacy research with the new dimensions 
of thinking, and provide the handheld device programmers a unique opportunity to model 
privacy in their applications, facilitating the onward journey of pervasive computing. 
The proposed location privacy framework is generic and flexible so it can be easily 
incorporated into existing and new systems that attempt to better protect users’ identities 
and their private information, without major modifications to the system and network 
infrastructure. The proposed approach challenges the traditional belief of the zero-sum 
tradeoffs between privacy and QoS, which can result in a major paradigm shift. The 
research outcome will effectively disseminate this new paradigm to the next generation of 
workforce in the related fields. It will help to the research community to develop new 
ideas and solutions when handling the privacy and security issues in location based 
systems and other distributed systems. 
7.3 Future Work 
The proposed framework SafeGrid, indeed, opens up new avenues for research in 
location privacy in LBS. Enforcement of reciprocity requirement and identity inference 
protection are the most interesting aspects of our approach, which the existing approaches 
have repeatedly ignored in most cases. Some of the future research scopes of SafeGrid 
and LBS privacy are discussed here.  
The performance of SafeGrid can be analyzed by investigating the dynamic 
reorganization of data structure on user movement with trees of other orders, such as 
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ternary trees. It is important to check how it performs in a dynamic environment with 
varying speeds of users in a simulated environment. In addition, we plan to compare its 
performance with other interesting choices of greedy heuristic that can determine disjoint 
anon sets of neighboring users. 
  The industry is constantly aiming at taking handheld devices like PDAs, cell 
phones, and smart phones to the next frontier of technology by accommodating more 
processing and storage capability. Battery power, however, stands as the bottleneck to 
long hours of continuous operation for these devices. With faster new gadgets and the 
requirements for trusting a third party LA, researchers have become very keen on 
investigating LBS models that get rid of LA [Chow06, Hashem07, Ghinita06,Ghinita08]. 
The peer-to -peer models [Chow06, Hashem07, Ghinita06] require that the peers 
establish trust relationships among themselves and share exact location information. In 
practice, this principle may even raise more privacy concerns.   In the approach depicted 
by Ghinita et. al [Ghinita08], the user retrieves a list of POIs through Private information 
retrieval method [Chor95] from the LBS. In this way, LBS doesn’t know what 
information has been requested, and sends the data structure on selected POIs (stored as 
Voronoi Tessellation with POIs) to the user prior to issuing a query. The user selects a 
number of POIs from the list and sends back to the server in order to determine the CR, 
which doesn’t involve any anon level. The issues with this approach are that the density 
control of the POIs is arbitrary at the provider’s end, and the additional overhead of 
filtering the result set is now the query issuer’s task. Future direction of privacy research 
in LBS is to find robust privacy measure, suitable data structures and secured protocol to 
support the very nature of resource-constrained devices. 
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